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Mergers in the
GB Electricity Market: effects on Retail Charges
The opening up of the UK residential electricity sector in 1999 prompted several 
studies of the impact this had on both the level and structuring of retail charges, and 
on incumbent players’ market power. Drawing on observations of regional tariffs for 
the month of January 2004, this paper supports previous conclusions based on 
simulated retail charges, looking at the response of real tariffs to distribution and 
transmission costs, customer density, and the length of low voltage underground 
circuit. We also investigate whether vertically integrated suppliers have a particular 
effect on charges ceteris paribus the effect of cost drivers and supplier-related 
factors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The GB residential electricity market was opened to competition in May 1999. This 
had an immediate impact on the level of tariffs and services offered to consumers.
The wave of mergers and acquisitions which followed raised concerns about the 
potential detrimental effect on end-customers. Although much research has been 
devoted to switching behaviour (Giulietti et al., 2006; Waterson, 2003; Ofgem, 2001, 
2002, 2003), third-degree price discrimination and incumbents’ market power (Otero 
and Waddams Price, 2001), little information is available about the effect of 
ownership structures on tariffs.
Oligopoly models show that the proposition that a merger enables firms to exploit 
economies of scale is not convincing if the merger does not also generate technical 
synergies. These synergies would lead to lower charges to customers (Spector, 2003; 
see also references herein). A study by Azzam and Rosebaum (2001) which 
considers the link between efficiency to concentration points out however that it is 
difficult to discriminate empirically between collusion and cost-efficiency as 
variables relating to price and profitability. The retail electricity market is a case in 
point, as high switching costs favour collusive behaviour, thus maintaining high 
prices.
Using 2002 price data Salies and Waddams Price (2004) examine similarities 
between the effects of brand coefficients on retail electricity prices within existing 
ownership groups but find that evidence of this is weak. Relying on tariffs levels 
from January 2004, the present paper contributes to the discussion by highlighting 
the effect of mergers on tariffs in a more efficient way. We test for the specific 
average effect of several ownership groups on regional electricity retail charges after 
Page 2 of 20
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
3
controlling for cost drivers, economies of scale and customer density. Particular 
attention is given to the effect of the creation of EDF Energy, the merged London 
Electricity and SEEBOARD group of companies. In broad terms, we conjecture that 
if technical synergies exist between distribution networks owned by EDF Energy 
(situated in contiguous regions: London, East and South-East England), they should 
result in lower prices.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly reviews the changes in 
ownership structures that occurred in the GB electricity sector between May 2002 
and January 2004. We focus on the probable effect of these changes on the degree of 
competition and remaining incumbents’ market power. We then introduce data, an 
econometric model and the hypotheses to be tested in section III. Results are given 
and discussed in section IV, before the conclusion in section V.
II. CHANGES IN MARKET STRUCTURE
The ownership structure of each supplier is summarised in the following table and 
compared with that of April-May 2002, being the period analysed by Salies and 
Waddams Price (2004).
[Insert Table 1]
A more detailed picture of the ownership structures of residential distributors and 
suppliers in GB as at January 2004 is given in the Appendix (see also Electricity 
Association, 2003a, b). At the intersection of any given row and column one can see 
whether a supplier (row) is an incumbent in the distribution region (column). A 
supplier may not be present in the selected region, as is the case for Basic Power. 
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Concentration increased from April 2002 as a result of acquisitions, with at the most 
five ex-Public Electricity Suppliers and three new entrants in most areas, in addition 
to internet and other suppliers (ex-Public Electricity Suppliers, hereafter “ex-PES”, 
are also known as Regional Electricity Companies). Almost all suppliers operate in 
the 14 distribution regions that make us England, Scotland and Wales. For reasons 
unknown to the authors, Basic Power was not operating in Scotland at the time of the 
study, which remains the case.
In April 2004 Scottish Hydro Electric-Southern Electric (SSE) acquired Atlantic 
Electric and Gas. Powergen purchased TXU’s British generation and retail 
operations. These mergers raise competition concerns although they may have 
different detrimental effects given that they involve firms with significantly different 
market shares. A merger between two firms, each with relatively high market share, 
may have less impact on competition than one in which a large supplier merges with 
a smaller rival (RBB, 2002).
The magnitude of the coefficient applied to the ownership group dummies in 
comparison with the coefficient of other groups will help us to test the data for 
particular merger effects.1
III. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL
The retail charges pertain to 14 regions, with up to eight brand names per region. We 
consider here a single payment method (standard credit) at three levels of 
consumption. The distribution charges were taken from distributors’ published 
statements of charges for connection to and use of the distribution system (Ofgem, 
2004). Constituting 15-30% of a customer’s final bill, these vary across the 
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distribution regions according to the charges levied by the local distribution 
company, but are levied in the same manner to all suppliers using that distribution 
network. Generally the tariffs have two components: a charge per consumer and a 
charge per unit of electricity carried. We note that prepayment distribution charges 
differ from credit and direct debit charges.2 Transmission charges form 
approximately 13% of the invoice and vary from region to region. Charge levels are 
taken from the National Grid Transco web site (see National Grid Transco, 2003), 
and are those levied for the period 16:00 hours to 19:00 hours. Descriptive statistics 
are shown in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2]
For each level of consumption q = 1650, 3300, and 4950 kWh, we estimate the 
following model:
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ) rj
g
gjgrjrrrrmmrj oiunqtqdqc  ++++++=  654321
where indices r and j denote distribution region and supplier, respectively. The 
payment method is standard credit. “(q)” specifies variables the value of which varies 
with q.3 In addition:
crj = retail charge in region r from supplier j
dr = distribution charge in region r
tr = transmission charge in region r
nr = total number of distribution customers per km2 in region r (density)
ur = length of underground circuit in region r
irj = 1 if supplier j is the incumbent in region r; 0 otherwise (incumbency dummy)
ogj = 1 if supplier j belongs to ownership group g; 0 otherwise (group dummy)
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We estimate three regression equations, one for each simulated level of annual 
demand, relating retail charges to the cost elements which we could identify, to 
market characteristics and to incumbency and group dummies.
Salies and Waddams Price (2004) estimated a model similar to (1) with brand instead 
of group dummies. Brand dummies capture any effect of suppliers reflected in tariffs 
(including costs of purchasing electricity). Our model gives us an opportunity to test 
whether suppliers that are not vertically integrated with other market participants 
tend to price less compared with integrated suppliers. In this model we replaced 
brand dummies with fewer group dummies that measure the impact on retail charges
of the various ownership groups present in the market at the time of the analysis.
There are five mutually exclusive ownership groups: Powergen, Scottish Hydro 
Electric and Southern Electric, Scottish Power, EDF Energy, and Innogy, plus the 
three non-ex-PES companies, as listed in Table 1.
Given the findings of Salies and Waddams Price (2004), we expect costs variations 
across regions to be closely mirrored in tariff variations ( 1 to be close to 1, and 2
not exceeding one third, reflecting the shorter consumption period to which 
transmission charges correspond). We allow for both the number of customers and 
the distribution area using a ratio of the two. It is expected that denser (urbanised) 
areas allow suppliers to reduce per-customer marketing costs for a given network 
size, which would be indicated by a negative value for 3 . The length of low voltage 
underground circuit is used as a proxy for the size of the network. Underground 
circuit length has a very close correlation to the number of distribution customers 
(the correlation coefficient equals 0.88). Its effect on charges shall be measured by 
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4 . A negative value for this coefficient would more generally indicate economies 
of scale.
The additional power of incumbents (the ex-PES), who had retained a market share 
of between 50% and 85%, would be reflected in higher tariffs and a positive 
coefficient for the incumbency dummy, 5 . A positive and significant value for this 
coefficient may reflect the positive costs of switching from one ex-PES to another.
Using data from April 2002, Salies and Waddams Price (2004) test for heterogeneity 
between suppliers by examining the significance of brand dummy coefficients. Here, 
we test the hypothesis of whether vertical integration has a relatively significant 
effect on charges using 6 . Unlike the previous study which relied on signs of the 
estimated coefficients on brand dummies, the present analysis shows some 
improvement as it statistically tests for the significance of group dummy coefficients; 
group dummies replace brand dummies. We note that our model may be seen as a 
constrained version of a model with brand dummies.
We have not included a constant; thus, no base group is considered. This allows us to 
avoid near-colinearity problems and vacuous interpretation of the constant.
Following the Salies and Waddams Price (2004) we estimated a two-equation 
seemingly unrelated regression equation (SURE) model for standard and direct debit 
tariffs. We only report results of the standard credit equation. 
As there is a possibility of non-constant residual variance within each equation 
resulting from the spatial dimension of our data, we tested for conditional 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form within each equation using White’s (1980) test.
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We reject homoskedasticity at the 5% level of significance in the direct debit 
equation at 1650kWh. We may interpret this result as a stronger attempt from supply 
businesses to differentiate their tariffs in this market. As will be shown later, this 
result shows regional incumbents still enjoy market power, particularly in the direct 
debit market where most switching has occurred. The model’s coefficients are 
reported in Table 3.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
First we consider the responses of retail charges to distribution and transmission 
charges. As expected, the coefficient on distribution charges is significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level of significance. If we assume a 95% confidence interval 
centred about one, distribution costs are almost fully passed on to customers, except 
in the direct debit and prepayment equations at 1650kWh. With regard to 
transmission charges, our results are also similar to Salies and Waddams Price 
(2004), with a coefficient about one third due to the short consumption period to 
which these charges correspond (peak period from 16:00 to 19:00 hours). If in each 
equation at 3300kWh we multiply by three the estimated coefficient on the 
transmission variable then we obtain a value that ranges from about 0.7 to 0.8.
[Insert Table 3]
We find economies of density at 1650 kWh and less significantly at 3300 kW.
Closely related, the negative impact on retail charges of the length of the 
underground circuit in all markets would reflect economies of scale: a customer’s bill 
is lower in distribution regions that have more kilometres of circuit underground. The 
low significance of the coefficient applied to density might result from the excessive 
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correlation between this variable and circuit’s length variables. The existence of 
those economies leads us to reject the hypothesis that urban and rural customers 
benefit equally from competition. In any event, NAO (2001, p.8) reported that rural 
customers are less likely to change their electricity supplier than those who live in 
urban areas because many customers change their supplier in response to a visit from 
a sales agent, and direct marketing of electricity has so far been less intensive in rural 
areas. 
This negative relationship between retail charges and both the size of the network 
and the number of customers per km2 reflects first technical economies at the 
distribution stage: heavy investments create an incentive for distributors to spread 
their costs among a large number of connected households. This situation could 
support the increasing concentration through horizontal integration in the retail 
sector; given the existence of decreasing per customer distribution charges paid by 
suppliers, they have an interest in servicing a large number of customers. The two-
component structure of distribution tariffs in all but the Sweb regions implies 
technical economies of scale, in that the “per unit” distribution charge necessarily 
decreases when the amount of energy supplied to consumers increases.
As expected, Atlantic Electric and Gas and Basic Power have the lowest impact on 
charges with potential average annual savings (see Waterson, 2003) of up to £50, as 
between the cheapest and the most expensive supplier. Note that these savings do not 
account for consumer perception of switching costs. This difference was highest in 
the direct debit market at 4950kWh (we do not report this result). Conversely, the 
effect of Innogy and Powergen groups on charges is greater or equal to the average 
effect. This seems consistent with integrated suppliers charging higher prices raising 
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competition concerns. It is well known that the existence of consumer switching 
costs creates a further incentive for firms to grab more customers, which necessarily 
gives an advantage to older suppliers in the market (Farrell and Klemperer, 2004).
Ofgem (2003, p.38) reports that more households are switching to non-prepayment 
markets and low-income customers switch less often.
Interestingly, EDF Energy group has, on average, a lower impact on charges than 
SSE and Innogy. We suspect a more efficient vertically integrated structure and 
pricing strategy. Note that EDF Energy includes the Seeboard and Eastern 
distribution businesses that are in neighbouring regions. It is worth noting, as Spector 
(2003) emphasises, that the proposition that a merger allows firms to exploit 
economies of scale is not convincing if the merger does not also generate technical 
synergies, through learning for example. Technical synergies may exist between 
distribution networks owned by EDF Energy because they are in contiguous regions 
(London, the East and South East). In addition, EDF Energy holds generation assets, 
giving it the ability to bypass the volatile and often illiquid electricity exchanges in 
order to hedge its customer base.
SSE also seems efficient at low consumption levels compared with Powergen, 
Scottish Power, Innogy and British Gas, but overall less efficient than the EDF
Energy group. Unlike this latter entity, SSE owns very distant networks, one in 
Scotland and the other in the South of England, which, in accordance with our 
previous discussion, would not favour technical synergies.
V. CONCLUSION
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Using regional observations on tariffs offered in December 2003, the present paper 
set out to investigate the particular effect of various integrated structures on the 
relationship between annual retail charges and cost drivers. We find evidence of 
different pricing strategies by the various ownership groups, which suggests that the 
effect on retail charges of integrated suppliers varies depending on the spatial 
dispersion of the merged networks.
Overall these results support Salies and Waddams Price (2003, 2004) who also 
pointed out the negative (respectively positive) effect on unit rates and bills of a 
change in the number of customers (respectively the distribution area). Our density 
variable, however, provides a more flexible interpretation as the particular influence 
on charges in rural (less dense) areas proves to be significant. Alongside this 
variable, the size of the underground network leads to a similar result as the number 
of customers: coefficient estimates range from –0.7 to –0.3. For example, if the 
underground circuit increases by 3,000 km, then retail charges would decrease by £1 
in the standard credit market at 1,650kWh.
We could bring more information to the discussion by extending the range of 
consumption levels considered or using longitudinal data. This would have the 
further advantage of increasing the number of observations for brands such as 
Manweb, SWEB, Swalec, and Seeboard.
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Endnotes
1
. This group acquired SWALEC in 2000 thus we do not ignore the influence of the SWALEC 
acquisition.
2
. For Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro regions, we employed data from the 2002-03 period as this 
was the only data available to us in the appropriate format (p/kWh) when completing the present 
study. Prepayment distribution standing charges were replaced with their non-prepayment equivalent 
when the data was missing, which occurs in four regions. At 1,650kWh, this substitution is fairly 
accurate, as the extra charge for prepayment customers does not exceed £10, i.e. 15% of distribution 
charges (or less than 3% of retail charges).
3
. Given the non-linear structure of most tariffs offered by network utilities (see Wilson, 1997), these 
models have some advantage over models considering a single mean level of consumption. V.-
Cervera and J-Málaga (2001) and Ofgem’s works also consider more than one level of annual 
demand. This methodology is appropriate as most tariffs intersect at some level of consumption 
reflecting various pricing strategies and tactics to attract targeted consumers; some suppliers prefer to 
target low energy demand customers while others offer attractive tariffs to customers whose annual 
demand exceeds an average level known to suppliers.
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Table 1. Ownership structure for main supply brands in April 2002 and January 
2004 (a)
April 2002 January 2004
Ex-PES
London Electricity (SWEB) EDF Energy (London Energy, SWEB 
Energy, SEEBOARD Energy) (b)
SEEBOARD
ScottishPower (Manweb) ScottishPower (Manweb)
Npower (Northern, Yorkshire) Npower (Northern, Yorkshire)
Scottish Hydro Electric and Southern Electric
   (SWALEC)
Scottish Hydro Electric and Southern Electric
   (SWALEC)
Powergen Powergen (Eastern, Norweb)
TXU-Europe (Eastern, Norweb)
Non ex-PES
Amerada, Atlantic Electric and Gas, Utility 
Link (Basic Power), British Gas
(c)
 Atlantic Electric and Gas, Utility Link 
(Basic Power), British Gas
(a)
 Mergers are underlined, and acquisitions represented with parentheses, with the 
name of the owner before the parenthesis.
(b)
 LE Group completed its acquisition of SEEBOARD in July 2002. Before that 
date, SEEBOARD was held by American Electric Power. It became SEEBOARD 
Energy Ltd in 2002. LE Group changed its name to EDF Energy in 2003, and its 
supply brand, London Electricity, changed its name to London Energy.
(c) Amerada became part of Powergen and was re-branded Powergen in 2003.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics - January 2004 (a)
Mean Std. Dev.
Minimum 
Value
Maximum 
Value
Total charge per annum for standard credit
  1650 kWh 14 593 1244 12 300 17 900
  3300 kWh 24 553 1906 21 100 29 500
  4950 kWh 34 520 2927 29 700 42 000
Total charge per annum for direct debit  
  1650 kWh 13 470 1145 11 400 16 300
  3300 kWh 23 215 2036 19 300 28 000
  4950 kWh 32 939 19 077 27 200 39 700
Total charge per annum for prepayment
  1650 kWh 15 922 1885 11 800 22 000
  3300 kWh 26 547 2308 21 900 33 900
  4950 kWh 37 187 2890 31 000 45 900
Distribution charge per annum, non prepayment
  1650 kWh pa 3793 632 2687 4735
  3300 kWh pa 5919 1079 4275 7933
4950 kWh pa 8044 1732 5720 11 449
Distribution charge per annum for prepayment
1650 kWh pa 4045 891 2687 5833
  3300 kWh pa 6170 1128 4275 7933
  4950 kWh pa 8296 1680 5720 11 449
Transmission charge per annum
  1650 kWh 2009 957 136 3478
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  3300 kWh 4018 1915 272 6956
  4950 kWh 6028 2873 409 10 434
Distribution customers, 000 1961 679 673 3381
Size of distribution area, in km2 15 928 11 300 667 54 500
Density (distribution customers / km2) 356 780 12 3124
Underground circuit (km) 22 081 8466 8917 36 302
(a)
 Charges are inclusive of VAT.  
Table 3. Standard Credit; Dependent variable: annual bill
Annual consumption
1650kWh 3300kWh 4950 kWh
Distribution Charge .86 *** 1.03 *** .89 ***
(.12) (.07) (.07)
Transmission Charge .54 *** .26 *** .16 ***
(.08) (.03) (.03)
Density (customers / km2) –.23 ** –.16 * –.20
(.09) (.08) (.13)
Underground Lines (×1000) –.32 *** –.38 *** –.69 ***
(.09) (.09) (.13)
Incumbent 7.51 *** 18.69 *** 29.74 ***
(2.64) (1.82) (2.63)
Suppliers (£)
Sempra Energy, etc. (Atlantic 
Electric and Gas)
101.46 *** 167.07 *** 256.51 ***
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(7.65) (6.41) (8.16)
Utility Link (Basic Power) 116.68 *** 176.89 *** 260.51 ***
(7.64) (6.34) (8.06)
Powergen 111.06 *** 191.49 *** 296.07 ***
(7.44) (6.40) (8.14)
SSE 104.51 *** 182.75 *** 284.68 ***
(7.46) (6.43) (8.19)
Scottish Power 119.88 *** 186.18 *** 276.83 ***
(7.44) (6.40) (8.15)
EDF Energy 103.30 *** 175.69 *** 272.72 ***
(7.48) (6.44) (8.20)
Innogy 111.94 *** 182.27 *** 286.07 ***
(7.58) (6.40) (8.14)
Centrica (British Gas) 113.74 *** 179.28 *** 270.44 ***
(7.45) (6.41) (8.16)
Adj. 2R .731 .909 .919
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. ‘*’ = significant at the 10% level. ‘**’ = significant at the 
5% level. ‘***’ = significant at the 1% level. 
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Appendix.  Ownership structure in the UK residential electricity market at December 2003
Aquila Inc. Owned Investor Investor Owned
First E. Corp. Private Owned Owned Private
EDF EDF Scottish Aquila Sterling Mid United SSE Power Scottish EDF SSE Power Mid
Energy Energy Power First Energy American Utilities Distribution Power Energy Distribution American
EDF East EDF Scottish Northern United Scottish H. Scottish EDF Southern Western Western Yorkshire
Energy Midlands Energy Power Aquila Electric Utilities Electric Power Power Energy Electric Power Power Power Electric
Networks Electric Networks Manweb Networks Distribution Electric Distribution Distribution Networks Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution
EPN EME LPN SP Manweb Aquila NEDL United Utilities S+S SP Distribution SPN S+S WPD WPD YEDL
Ultimate Region Scottish Scottish South Yorkshire
Owner Owner  Supplier Hydro Power East and Humber
E. ON Powergen Powergen I I E E E E I E E E E E E E
EdF EDF London
(State) Energy Energy
Scottish ScottishPower
Power Manweb
RWE Innogy npower E E E E I N E E E E E E E N
Northern
Supply
Scottish Hydro
Electric
Scottish ScottishPower
Power Energy Retail
EDF Seeboard
Energy Energy
Southern
Electric
Public SSE SWALEC N N N N N N N N N N N I N N
EDF Sweb
Energy Energy
Yorkshire
Supply
Atlantic Electric
and Gas
basicpower E E E E E E E N N E E E E E
British Gas E E E E E E E E E E E E E E
Number of Suppiers 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 8 8 8 8 8
I = Incumbent, E = Entrant, N = Neither.  (a) SSE counts for one supplier
Manweb region = Merseyside, Cheshire, North Wales.  Scottish Hydro region = North Scotland.  Scottish Power region = South and Central Scotland
Public
Centrica
E E
N N
N N
E E
I E E E E E E N E E N E
N I N N N N N N N N N N
N N N I N N N N N N N N
E E E E E I E EE E N N
I E E E
N N N NN N N N N I N N N N
E E E E E E E N E E I N E E
N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N
N
N N N
IN N N
E E
N
EE E E E E E
N I
E EE
Public SSE (a)
EdF
RWE Innogy
Sempra Energy, 
John Shannon, etc.
E E
Ultimate Owner EDF E. ON EDF Public Public Public EDF
PPL PPLPowergen
E E EE E E N E E
Owner
Distributor
E
Trading Name
Manweb W. Midlands North East North West
Utility Link
Eastern E. Midlands London
EdF
Public
RWE Innogy
Public SSE (a)
Southern South Wales South West
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